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COMPROMISE ON POLAND SOUGHT AT SAN FRANCISCO

WASHINGTON, April 23 — Poland is the key to success or failure at the United Nations Conference on International Organization which opens in San Francisco on April 25. So long as the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union disagree over the Polish government, they will be unable to agree to cooperate fully for the maintenance of peace. For that reason the arrival of Soviet Foreign Commissar Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff in Washington on April 22, for conversations on the Polish question, is an event of monumental importance.

The outlook for agreement was poor when Commissar Molotoff reached Washington, however, and early understanding could come only as a result of masterful diplomacy. For the issues in the Polish question are today exactly what they were a year ago, and efforts during the past year to solve the problem have failed. The United States and Britain continue to recognize the Polish government-in-exile, with which Russia broke off relations on April 25, 1943; while the Soviet Union recognizes the Polish régime in Warsaw. The disagreement on the make-up of the Polish government reveals a fundamental difference of view among the United States, Britain and Russia about Poland's place in the world.

SOVIET CONCERN FOR SECURITY. While the Poles are a distinct nation, the land they inhabit has as much meaning for Soviet security as Cuba, Canada, Mexico and the Pacific islands have for United States security. Accordingly, the purpose of Russian policy is to insure the existence of a Polish government that will be ever appreciative of the Soviet Union's interest in international relations, a government in other words that will be satisfactory to both Poland and Russia. The wording of the note by which Molotoff severed relations with the London government emphasized this point of view; for it

accused the Poles of having "adopted a hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union."

In the Warsaw régime, in which Edward Osubka-Morawski is Prime Minister, the Soviet Union sees the sort of government it wants in Poland, and the core of the present disagreement among the powers lies in the Soviet Union's concern lest replacement of that government might result in the introduction of elements unfriendly to Russian interests. This concern has animated the Soviet Union with respect to Poland since the conference in Yalta, at which it was announced that President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin had agreed to the creation of a commission which would bring into being a Polish Government of National Unity.

But the Yalta decision has been fruitless. Britain and the United States maintained that its purpose was to create a wholly new government in which some members of the Warsaw group would participate; the Soviet Union held that its purpose was to add new members to the existing Warsaw régime. The Soviet attitude was fortified by the development of doubts about Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, formerly Prime Minister in the London government. Britain and the United States hoped that the revised régime would include him. On February 16 the Soviet paper, *Red Star*, referred to Mikolajczyk in friendly fashion as a prospective candidate for membership in the new government. But on that same day he wrote in London an article urging the inclusion of Galicia and Lwow in the future Poland—a proposal which was taken as an implied criticism of the Polish territorial settlement reached at Yalta. As a result, *Pravda* on February 18 listed Mikolajczyk among the "Polish reactionaries." In an effort to improve the prospects for creation of a compromise government, Mikolajczyk on April 18 announced his unequivocal approval of the Yalta decision.

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POLAND AT SAN FRANCISCO. Soviet support of the Warsaw régime has been repeatedly indicated since Yalta. In March the Soviet Union asked that the Warsaw government be invited to the San Francisco Conference. On April 1 Britain and the United States refused this request. Boleslaw Bierut, president of the Warsaw government, on March 3 argued thus in behalf of the invitation: "Poland is not to be among the nations that will debate the future of the world. The Polish nation cannot let this pass. Our honor is at stake, and the dignity of the Polish nation, and this state of affairs must be changed as soon as possible." On April 17 the Soviet Union renewed its request for an invitation for Warsaw. A day later Britain and the United States again refused, on the ground that if Poland were to be represented at San Francisco, it should be represented by a combined government set up in satisfaction of the Yalta agreement: On April 21 the Soviet Union and the Warsaw government concluded a treaty of "friendship and mutual assistance." It was signed by Stalin, Osubka-Morawski and Bierut.

The signing of this treaty does not give the Warsaw government perpetual status, although any suc-

cessor could adopt the treaty as a solemn Polish obligation. But there is small likelihood of revision of the Soviet attitude unless the United States and Britain can persuade Molotoff that Russia's interests will be completely safeguarded by an expanded government. A major difficulty in the way of earlier agreement among the three powers has been ignorance of the wishes of the Polish people in the matter. Most of the personnel of the two rival governments spent a considerable portion of the war outside Poland and for that reason lack a full understanding of tendencies within the country. As an important preliminary to final agreement on the Polish government, the three powers might well appoint a commission empowered to ascertain the state of opinion among Poles who remained in Poland. Otherwise a Polish settlement can be made only in a vacuum, or simply to satisfy the requirements of non-Polish political interests. What is known about Polish popular desires comes primarily from reports issued by the two régimes, which cannot have an objective attitude in their estimates of the public opinion on which they report.

BLAIR BOLLES

GERMAN BRUTALITIES STRESS NEED FOR ACTION ON WAR CRIMES

EN ROUTE TO SAN FRANCISCO. A cold rain is beating against the window panes as the train speeds through the green Ohio countryside. Fruit trees are in tender bloom. But in spite of the throbbing hope of an end to war in Europe, this spring of 1945 will always be remembered as a sad spring. It is overshadowed by the death of a United Nations leader who more than any other man had come to symbolize the post-war aspirations of humanity. It is tragically darkened by irrefutable testimony from Germany that we are fighting not only German soldiers and weapons of war, but an evil spirit so cruel and so deep-seated that minds untouched by it recoil even now from crediting its manifestations.

THE UNSEEN DELEGATES. It is absorbing to speculate as to the character the San Francisco Conference might assume if most of the delegates, and the innumerable others who swarm around international conferences, were men and women who had seen active service on the world's fighting fronts, had struggled against the Nazis in resistance movements, or had lived through the horrors of imprisonment in Germany. With a few exceptions these men and women will not be present at the Conference. Would they be troubled, as some of us are, by procedural matters, such as the number of votes in the General Assembly or the categories of countries to be represented on the Security Council? Would they be primarily concerned with the prestige of their respective nations, or would they be angrily determined to safeguard the rights of all human beings, irrespective

of nation, race and creed, against such indignities as were inflicted on them by the Nazis? Would they be satisfied with the admittedly compromise machinery of international cooperation for security proposed at Dumbarton Oaks, or would they demand the acceptance by their countries of much more far-reaching obligations to check any incipient threat to peace, and self-denying commitments to abstain from actions conducive to war?

WE MUST NOT BECOME LIKE NAZIS. Only to the extent that the political and civic leaders and the diplomats who will be drafting the charter of the United Nations represent the views of these unseen delegates, as well as their own, will they be building machinery for a world of stark realities, not of wishful thinking. The San Francisco Conference, it cannot be said too often, is not a peace conference. But it cannot be insulated from the problems of the peace. And international machinery to prevent war, no matter how elaborate, cannot of itself protect us against the evil spirit that permeates Germany and Japan like a poisonous miasma unless—and this is a fundamental condition—we unremittingly assert and practice a diametrically opposite way of life. The moment we slip, however unconsciously, into some of the practices we denounce on the part of our enemies, we diminish ourselves as human beings.

The need to maintain, and constantly improve, our own standards of how man should deal with man raises acute problems at this moment, when a legiti-

mate desire for revenge may cause us to perpetuate the very horrors we would like to avenge. The conscience of mankind calls for the punishment of "war criminals." Yet we may ask what is our definition of "war crimes"? Are von Papen and Krupp as guilty as Hitler and Himmler? A strong case could be made for the affirmative. But then we would have to say that not only the brutalities of the Gestapo, but the diplomatic and industrial activities that abet war are criminal: in short, that war is a crime. Hitherto most of us, except outright pacifists, have allowed the idea to prevail that war can somehow be humanized if we adhere to some rules and regulations in waging it. If this was possibly true in the days of knighthood, it is obviously untrue now, when the pressure of a man's finger can release a load of bombs capable of destroying hundreds of people the bombardier does not even see. All Germans who can be identified as having ordered or condoned acts of brutality toward

their own people and those of conquered countries should be eliminated as a matter of military necessity—not in courts, for there is no international law in existence under which most of them could be brought to trial. Beyond this category of indisputable "war criminals" we enter a debatable sphere.

But whatever decision is made about the von Papens and Krupps, let us not indulge the illusion that by eliminating a group of men who were willing to work with Hitler (as they had once done with the Kaiser), we shall prevent the resurgence of militarism in Germany. Many Germans who were not Nazis, or Junkers, or diplomats, or industrialists, hoped to benefit by Germany's conquests. If they are to change their attitude, if they are to be reintegrated into Europe, they must learn to hate the crimes that were committed in their name.

VERA MICHELE DEAN

U.S. RECOGNITION LEAVES ARGENTINE ISSUES UNRESOLVED

When, on April 9, the United States formally accorded diplomatic recognition to the Farrell-Perón government of Argentina, it wrote finis to a curious chapter in inter-American relations. The manner in which the two countries terminated their estrangement was itself an appropriate ending to the stalemate which had existed since the military group took power on February 28, 1944. After many months, punctuated by quite undiplomatic strictures against the Axis sympathies and totalitarian practices of the Argentine régime, the State Department suddenly determined to assume an optimistic attitude regarding Argentina's declaration of war and the future moves of Buenos Aires in support of continental defense. On the other hand, President Farrell and War Minister Perón dramatically shifted their policy toward the United States. For although these Argentine leaders had previously claimed they had been given no motive for abandoning the traditional neutrality of their country, they declared war on the strength of a politely worded invitation from the other American countries to adhere to now-familiar hemisphere defense measures. The two countries—until a few weeks ago so bitterly opposed—are now actively engaged in concerting measures of mutual assistance against an enemy which no longer has the power to attack.

THE PRICE OF BELLIGERENCY. Some time, of course, must elapse before this cordial understanding can be translated into close diplomatic and commercial relations. To the end of easing Argentina over this awkward period, a United States mission composed of high officials of the State Department visited Buenos Aires last week—while the flagship of the South Atlantic squadron stood by in the harbor. It is to be assumed that the Buenos Aires govern-

ment thoroughly acquainted the mission with its pressing production and transport needs. A recent Argentine study estimated that country's import deficits as amounting to \$825 million in iron, steel, coal, lumber and rubber, and in machinery, motors and building materials. It is true that sizeable shortages have accumulated through 1944 and 1945, although such deficits are probably not more acute proportionately than in many other Latin American countries. These shortages must continue through the better part of 1945, since allocations for the third quarter of the year have already been drawn up, and shipping is scarce. But now that Argentina has become one of the "associated nations" cooperating in the war effort, there does not seem to be any reason why it should not have access to existing surpluses, to be shipped whenever the transportation situation is alleviated.

In exchange for release of surplus materials, however, this country, as a partner to the United Nations meat contract, would expect a compensatory increase of Argentine beef shipments, which in the first two months of 1945 had fallen 50 per cent below the amounts sent abroad during the corresponding period in 1944, and had recently been virtually suspended owing to a strike of meat-packers in protest against an attempt to lay off 12,500 workers. Whatever the explanations advanced for the local and export meat shortage, it cannot be denied that there is an ample supply on the Argentine plains which could be shipped to Europe for military and civilian use if the government, cattlemen and consumer public were so inclined. In view of the commercial gains that Buenos Aires will now make, this should not be too great a concession.

After the mission's visit, Argentines were con-

fident that another dividend of the recent declaration of war would be an invitation to participate in the San Francisco Conference. The chain of events which began at Mexico City may have given them certain grounds for this assumption. But the United States would hardly have it in its power to take Argentina to San Francisco without the full concurrence of Russia. If Argentina were invited to San Francisco, too, this would raise anew the question of the participation of neutral states which, unlike Argentina, did not belatedly align themselves with the United Nations. These states might claim the right to similar representation, on the ground that, while they had not complied with the formality of declaring war, their treatment of the Allies had variously been more benevolent or less obstructive than that of Argentina.

END OF AN EPISODE? On his arrival at San Francisco, Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel Padilla voiced the wish of Latin Americans that Argentina be present. Whether at the last moment an invitation will be forthcoming depends, to some extent at least, on how desirous Washington is of presenting to the world security conference the example of a strongly unified hemispheric body. In recognizing that government, Washington elected to overlook certain shortcomings in both its external and internal policies. Opening the way for Argentina to go to San Francisco may, in its opinion, be the final measure required by the Mexico City resolution.

It now appears evident that the State Department has abandoned former Secretary Cordell Hull's policy of employing nonrecognition as a weapon to bring about desired changes in an unrecognized government's foreign policies. It has returned, instead to the traditional principle of automatic recognition, provided the minimum essentials of legality and order are present. The Department might argue,

indeed, that it has merely rectified the previous conduct of Latin American affairs in the interest of consistency, so that Argentina might receive equal treatment with other Latin American dictatorships which, because they pursued foreign policy objectives similar to those of the United States, received recognition. Finally, Washington may justify its recognition of the military régime as a return to a strict interpretation of the principle of nonintervention, long the aim of American states in their dealings with one another. In a recent broadcast, Assistant Secretary Nelson Rockefeller claimed that democracy cannot be superimposed by force from the outside. It must grow up from the people; and economic and social conditions must be present which encourage and permit its growth.

If, as it now appears, some aspects of the Hull policy represented a temporary departure from our long-term objectives, there is no question but that, inconsistent and fumbling though it may have been, it did give those Latin Americans at variance with their dictatorial governments some hope that the United States—together with other American republics or alone, if necessary—would require as a criterion for recognition the existence of internal democracy. The recent wave of demonstrations and strikes in Argentina—which culminated on April 23 in the arrest of 400 persons and the imposition of even stricter censorship—testifies to their disappointment that this is not to be the case. Like many observers in this country, they first erred in interpreting Secretary Hull's statements too broadly. As long as Argentine liberals believe the United States has "let down the good friends of democracy," however, the incident cannot be regarded as closed.

OLIVE HOLMES

THE F.P.A. BOOKSHELF

Mr. Roosevelt, by Compton Mackenzie. New York, E. P. Dutton, 1944. \$3.75

Despite interesting details and attractive illustrations, this biography has a feeling of unreality, probably because the well-known novelist's point of view is British rather than American.

Justice and World Society, by Laurence Stapleton. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1944. \$2.00

Discusses the universal ideal of justice, long known as "Law of Nature," suggesting a modern interpretation for real democracy.

Compass of the World: A Symposium on Political Geography, edited by Hans W. Weigert and Vilhjalmur Stefansson. New York, Macmillan, 1944. \$3.50

The editors and other geographers have done much to

show the false conclusions that advocates of geopolitics have drawn from the earth's configuration and to bring out the importance of air transport to political geography.

What the Negro Wants, edited by Rayford W. Logan. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1944. \$3.50

Since race relations are indubitably among the important questions for post-war democracies, this thoughtfully written symposium by representative Negroes is of great value.

Twenty-five Troubled Years, 1918-1943, by F. H. Soward. New York, Oxford University Press, 1944. \$3.00

Useful outline of this era presented with simplicity and clarity in an expanded outline of courses for Canadian service men.

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